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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
In 19B€ the Uni ted States goverYillIen t declared 'A'ar cn 
dr n gs . In att e mp ting t o reduce domes tic d.rug abuse and 
in"ternat ional drug t raff i cking, t he Whi t e House in September 
1 989 es t ab l iS:"led t:'l.e Off ice of ))c:. "tional Drug Cont rol Pol icy 
(ONDCP) as a management f ra rF.e ·.-Jork to coordinat e national 
antidrug effor t s . The National Drug Cont rol Strategy o f the 
Un i t e d s t .o."tes e vo lved from t he ONDC? 
By 1995 , and a : ter spending lJilli8hs in tax do l lars t. c 
f und ant.idrug pro;rdffiS, the drug ab use and traffi ckin g probl em 
s t i l l ex i st . Efforts t o counter drugs have only expanded the 
V.o.5 t an tidrug bureaucracy, creat ing a near l y s t a t ic po l icy . 
Programs t arge t i ng drug supp l ie rs overseas have had o nl y 
limited S'..lccess , '''';'l.ile s"training rela-:-.ions wi tl: 
countries. 
The fac t or s t ha t h.o.ve u :1dermi neci. success i n an t idrug 
ef f orts ca:1 be arranged u:1der t he broad categories of 
economics and pol i t i cs . Ecunomically, t.he $50 :ni ll i on t o $60 
mi llion res t ricti ve (J . S . ant idrug assis tance to so u rce 
na :. io:1s in :"'atin America represe:l t s a small SUlf. 'Alh en compared 
t o t he $7 b i llion of illegal drug revenues re inves t. ed 1 :1 "the 
Co l cmbian econu.:ny every year , and t he $ 1 10 bil lion spent 
annu ally by u.s . consumers on i l legal d r ugs. ?olitically , 
inter-agency coordinat .:'.on fa i lc.re, non-compliance with policy 
concept.:;, ane! unrealistic stra"tegy ob j ect ... ves have al l 
contr ibuted to the continued f a i lure of an t i d:-ug po l icy . 
':he thesis eXaJ1iEeS the goals and objectives of the 
of the the 
~nltia':ive, and the:] offRLs sever-a 1 arglJInen::s ':01 .,-heir 
fail\;res. ':'he thesis contends that antidLJg efforts 
to fail en ":_helr- pr-escnt form 1f :-,0'( res'Cr-Jctured. 
The thesis 
c00rd~naticL,· 
,::'e -:-1esis cor.cl0.dcs that ltihen 1l.S. 
conslG.cr fLlt:.JLe antion:.":;! 
po:"icy-maker5 need to ins'::itutR effectlve 
compliar.ce with federal 
SolutlCL '",i th s0.ppl Y 
l::1::erJ.ic::io:l, :-wt ·,,'itr. expanced fcraig::1 CissistCince, '",i::r. 
targetir.lJ 0.ser ","De,"aD"" 2tates. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Drug war efforts expa~ded sig~ificantly to include U. S . 
military participation . ~ 
In his efforts t o address the drug problem, Preside n t 
Reagan created the Office of National Drug Control Policy, a 
Cabinet leve l agency, as part of the Executive. Instituted 
under t he Bush Adrni~is t ra t ion, t he ONDCP developed a 
comprehensive, coordina t ed plan t o address drug related 
activi t y . s The Na t ional Drug Contro l Strategy evolved f rom 
this ef::or t , as an effor t to overcome the drug problem both 
domestica l ly and abroad . 
A more regionalize d approach t o the surging cocaine 
problem surfaced wit h the Andean Initiative . On February 15, 
1990 President Bush and t he l eaders of Bo l ivia, Colombia, and 
Peru met at the Cartagena Sturor.it to discuss cooperative 
ant idrug operat i ons . " This strategy was instituted by 
President Bush as a multila t eral effort to direct U. S. 
a.ntid!"ug ac t ion in the Andean source count ries . 
Two maj or factors have undermined success in ant idrug 
policy. The first is economics , probably the single most 
important factor as to why the drug war stil l exists . The 
U. S . provides $50 million t o $60 mi l lio n in direct aid 
annually to Co l ombia for antidrug assistance. That represents 
• Defense Authorizatio n Jl.ct of 1989, Department of Defense 
Ass i gned a s Lead Agency for Detection and Mcnitoring of Suspect ed 
D!"ug Traff i ckers, U.S . Government P!"int ing Office, September 
1989. 
5Dione M. Canova. The Nationa l Drug Control strategy, A 
Synopsis. Handboo k of Drug Control in the United States by James 
Inciar:ii, Greenwood, 1 990, 339 . 
&U.S . Congressiona l Hearing, Andean Initiative, U. s . 
Government Print'--ng Office , 6 & 20 J u ne 1990, 97 . 

The importance of this thesis is based on the following: 
(11 wi thin the United States drug abuse s trains the medical, 
legal, and law enfcrcement services; (2) vast efforts to 
counter this threat have failed ; and (3) the international war 
on drugs affects state to state relations. 
This thesis will atterr,pt to explain the failures of the 
U.S. National Drug Control Strategy and Andean I nitiative by 
offering several arguments. Concerning economics, arguments 
will incll:de: (1) why the profitability of drug trafficking 
supersedes the effcrts made by U.S. policy; (2) how l!\oney 
launci.ering networks are practically impenetrable; (3) why 
U. S. foreign financial assistance programs are ineffective; 
a:1d (4) how the corruption potential within the drug trade has 
impacteci. efforts to ccunter that trade . 
For political failures, argurr.ents will include: (1) how 
U.S. government covert cperations concerning illegal drug 
traff icking have undermined legitimate e fforts ; (2) '..:hy the 
vast U. S. bureaucracy is unable to coordinate antidrug 
agenc~es; (3) hew U.S. drug policy itself is really 
unilateral; (4) how the U.s. judiciary lacks consistency in 
drug related cases; (5) why drug cartels are essentially too 
pOvlerful for Latin American governments to subdue; (6) ' .. :hy 
u . S. foreign po l icy relating to drug trafficking has been 
inconsistent; and (7) ho''': a high ly effective and resourceft.:l 
U.S. military has beer. misused. 
Chapter I will provide a historical overvievl of the modern 
drug probleTl',. Subseqt.:er.t chapters will provide 
comprehensive swnrnary of the U.S. National Drug Control 
Strategy and Andean Initiat i ve including their origins and 
operative framework. 
=c.=-1i::17. Ee(_:)L'.rnell~ci'::=-onS dld ;;Ft.~Cr.S for f'J:::urc 
vl-=-_1 be of.r::e:::-ej a.;; ~",-.c- of the COLt-:'USlon. 
w-=-ll 0::11 v f02US or. i2,",:::-=-druq 
Strate,,:! and 
p.njoar. =n~tlatlve as ::he',; relate :::0 -h", U:-L -eel Sti2::e'3 and t:le 

II. STRATEGY OVERVIEW 
A. POLICY ROOTS 
ar::~arellt i.,.~th the deaths c:>t two 
at:.ribuled 
forced 
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Figure 2 - 1. Federal Drug Contro l Spending 
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Data 
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C. ANDEAN INITIATIVE 
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III. STRATEGY FAILURE ARGUMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. ECONOMIC RELATED FAILURES 
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1' 8 claim, that all economic aid by the United States has no 
effect on the drug wac: ir. Latin JI_"TleriCOi would be an 
overs ta tement . However, bOisec. on the fac t s presented, the 
likelihood for success of U . S . economic ass i stance to drug 
producing count ries i s questionable. Future success in the 
drug war effort may depend on a mo re f lexible U.S . po l icy that 
addresses consumption in addition to supply, and which is more 
cognizant of the prob l ems confronting dl'Ug producing 
cou:1t1:ies. 
Simularity of interest is essent:"a l f or bilateral 
operations. If U.S. interes t s differ significantly from tr 
of parL.cipating source nations , then policy should be 
adjusted t o ref lec t tr,ose changing interests. Past his: ry 
has enabled critics t o agree that coercive measures in po . :y 
imf: _ementation have not a l ways worked. Latin American natic 
one ~ cornered into submission by the threat of commun~ ]1 , 
in. : rgency, and drug prob:'ems, now have more leverage, 
con .:i idering cooperatio:1. The United Stat es needs to cons t r --::t 
a f: )licy t ha t is consis t ent wi th these regional c ha r.ges. 
I n conclusion to this section, the c.isproportiona· 1y 
la1 1e amoun t of money invested. in Latin Arr,erican econor· 
eVE y yea:: by drug cartels has easily outweighed the mi l l 
of ,:o1 1ars directed at cornbatting drug t rafficking . 
suggests that t he U. S. effort should be redirected at he 
del. nc side ot the equation, focusing instead -:>n the i1 1 E a1 
consum9tion of an estimated 165,000 pounds of cocaine by 
mi l lions of Arner :" car,s every year . Drug pro f i t ability, as many 
c ritics argue, is nct appc:oachable, when considering any type 
of effective antidrug policy. The United States ca:lr.ot compete 
'", Lth drug t1:affickers that invest over $7 bi l lion anr:.ually in 
t heir respective economies. The only successfu l po l icy 
40 
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3. Fore~gn Ass~stance Programs 
rno~t cl its 3.11L:lc.rug 
50 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Sectlon 506 (A) (1) 
Foreign .Z\ssistance Act of 1961, Section 506 (A) (2) 
Foreign Mlll tary Financing Program Assistance 
51 
::cmpletco . 
u. s. State Department International Narcotics Control 
Assistance Sectl.On 481 
De\jfolCJpcd ;;;.3 pc.rt the 
j-Jdi :ia 1 p:-otection, a::1d 
52 
ter 
Defense Department Assistance 
In 1990, $5 million was provided for improvement of 
intelligence capabilities for law enforcement and military 
agencies conducting antidrug operations. 
Other Foreign Hili tary Financing Program Assistance 
As part of the Foreign Operations Export Financing and 
Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1990, $3 million was 
provided for equipment, weapons, ammunition, and police 
helicopters. 
Export - Import Bank Loans 
Under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, $LOO million in 
loan guarantees were provided to Colombia for 1989 and 1990. 
The Export-Import Bank will guarantee 85 percent of any loan 
value, if Colombia can guarantee the remainder. Under this 
program, Colombia has purchased $84 million in equipment for 
antidrug operations. 94 
In conclusion, although millions of dollars have been 
transferred to the .Andean nations for antidrug efforts, there 
has been little success as a result of the funding programs. 
For example, between August 1989 and September 1990, the 
United states provided or programmed to Colombia $236 million 
in antidrug assistance for military and law enforcement 
agencies, $65 million in emergency aid, $122 million in grant 
9"Ibid, 34. 
53 
aid, and $84 million in loan guarantees. During the same 
period, the United states provided Peru $19 million in law 
enforcement aid. 
Most critics argue that although U. S. efforts appear 
genuine, they leave financial aid recipients very little 
flexibili ty. An example is the planning of financial aid 
packages for antidrug operations. The U. s. Congress 
specifically demanded that antidrug funds not be used for 
combating insurgency. Critics argue that drug traffickers and 
insurgency groups in many Latin American nations are tied 
together. For example, the Revolutionary Anned Forces of 
Colombia (FARC), an insurgency group, has not only established 
relations with drug cartels, but conducts drug trafficking 
operations. Documentation obtained by authorities indicated 
that FARC leaders had instructed members in seven of its 33 
fronts to extort from drug traffickers, totalling $563,380 
monthly.95 
The following represents a partial list of reasons that 
have been posited to explain why u.s. assistance programs are 
not effective in targeting drug trafficking in Colombia: (1) 
traditionally, the civilian and police agencies of Colombia 
maintain weak planning programs for policy implementation; (2) 
Colombia is at war with both drug traffickers, and insurgency 
groups, thus hindering efforts in direct antidrug operations; 
(3) drug cartels in Colombia have expanded their operations 
to include heroin production, and opium cultivation; 
meanwhile authorities are still struggling to overcome the 
cocaine problem; and finally (4) although Colombia is the 
~S"Doubts over FARC's Peace Commitment," Andean Group Report: 
Rand, RA-89-04, 22 January 1989. 
54 
center for cocaine distribution, the drug problem is regional. 
Therefore, Colomb_ian antidrug programs will only succeed if 
regional programs are effective as well.% 
Some critics argue that U.S. financial aid for antidrug 
programs is to restrictive, and refer to various measures 
proposed by the U.S. government as coercive tools to ensure 
cooperation by aid recipients. The United States has the 
options to: (1) invoke a 50 percent suspension of economic 
assistance in any fiscal year for non-compliance of U.S. 
policy guidelines when a source country is not cooperating; 
(2) to invoke a 100 percent suspension of economic assistance 
for any source nation that fails to certify (fu':l cooperation 
with 0.5. policy); (3) threaten to vote against source nations 
when they apply for loans through multilate-ral banks; (4) 
fail to allocate sugar quotas to source nations; (5) threaten 
to invoke duty increases, up to 50 percent of the value on 
source nations exports to the United states; (6) institute an 
interruption of air transportation and co:rnmercial traffic to 
and from source nations; and (7) withdraw U.S. participation 
in pre-clearance customs agreements with that source nation.9? 
Some critics argue that the u.S. Congress tas developed a 
coercive policy that leaves limited flexibility for other 
nations to follow. During the cold war era, coercive 
diplomacy by the United States worked quite effectively 
throughout Latin America. With the constant threat of 
~6The Drug War, Colombia is Implementing Antidrug Efforts, 
but Impact is Uncertain, U.s. General Accounting Office, 
GAo/T NSIAD 94-53, 5 October 1993, 5. 
97Raphae1 Perl, "International NarcoPolicy and The Role of 
the U.S. Congress," in Donald Mahrys, eds., The J .. atin American 
:Jrug Trade and U.S. National Security (Greenwood, 1989), 92 93. 
55 
co:mnunist expansion by the former Soviet Union, Latin American 
nations had little choice but to accept U.S. pressure. 
Presently, however, Latin American nations do have more 
latitude as U.S. policy-makers are learning. U.S. influence 
does not carry the same weight it once did, and coercion must 
be replaced with flexible policy measures to ensure 
cooperation and regional improvement. 
Future U.S. policy must allow for flexibility on the part 
of the governments of drug source nations in the use of funds 
to combat drug traffickers, as well insurgents.'B 
U.S. policy-makers must improve the control of programs and 
the management of financial assistance to better monitor 
policy achievements. This can be achieved by improving 
relations between united States embassy personnel and their 
counterparts, and by bettering relations with foreign military 
and police agencies. 
4. Corruption 
Corruption is often associated with dru~ t· '}:ie. Throughout 
government, military, and security forces of :"',"tin American 
source countries, lies the potential, and in many cases, the 
presence of corruption linked to the drug trade. This 
consequently results in compromising the professionalism, 
integrity, and effectiveness of those involved in antidrug 
efforts. It also contributes to destablizing democratic 
governments. It is difficult to strengthen democratic 
9iThe Drug War: Counter-narcotics Programs in Colombia 
and Peru, U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO/T NSIAD 92 9, 
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The final problem that plagues the effectiveness of the 
U.S. antidrug regime internationally is the lack of symmetry, 
which is defined by the failure to fairly distribute the costs 
and benefits of program management. This argument focuses on 
the realization that the United States has not allocated the 
burdens of the drug war equitably between itself and the Latin 
American nations. 
The United States, in implementing antidrug policy among 
the Andean nations, has failed to account for the positive 
impact the drug trade has had on the Latin American 
economies .11' The drug trade in the early 19905 is estimated 
to have produced an annual return of $7 billion to the 
Colombian economy alone. In Colombia for example, the 
Medellin cartel's leader, Pablo Escobar, had personally 
financed several public housing projects and provided food and 
amenities for the poor. 
In conclusion, consideration of the Bagley and Tokatlian 
argument is essential in recommending policy. The lack of 
legitimacy is accentuated by the fact that the United States 
has employed a unilateral drug policy in a multilateral forum. 
It has not realistically allowed the Andean nations to be part 
of the decision-making mechanism of current policy issues. 
Decision-makers must provide for joint, multilateral planning, 
and decision-making for all facets of antidrug policy to 
effectively work. 
'''John A. Peeler, "Elite Settlements and Democratic 
::::onsolidation, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Venezuela," in 
John Higley and Richard Gunthers, eds., Elites and Democratic 
::::onsolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe (Cambridge 
University Press, 1992), 107. 
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The U.S. antidrug policy also lacks credibility. Its 
objectives have clearly exceeded any realistic means to 
achieve set goals. The limited resources allocated to the 
Andean nations, and their perceived lack of dedication, have 
clearly made an impact. Policy-makers must consider the full 
scope of this problem from both a U.S. and Latin American 
perspective. Policy-makers need to be realistic when balancing 
assistance with expected results. 
In terms of symmetry, U. S. policy-makers have expected 
Latin American nations to aggressively attack the drug issue, 
while ignoring the reality that illegal drugs are not so much 
a Latin American issue, but a demand issue centered in the 
United States. Latin American nations have been forced to 
conduct the war on drugs with limited resources and heavy 
U.S. restrictions. In this context, U.S. Drug Control Strategy 
has failed. '-18 
4. U.S. Goverrunent Illegal Drug Acti vi ty 
Case: Iran - Contra 
While on the surface it appears that the United States has 
made serious attempts to eliminate (reduce) the international 
drug problem through the U.S. National Drug Control Strategy 
and the Andean Initiative, each of which reflect genuine 
planning efforts, observers in both the United States and 
Latin America have cause to question the sincerity of the 
llSBruce Michael Bagley and Juan G. Tokatliar., HExplaining 
The Failure of the U.S.-Latin Drug Policies," The United states 
and Latin America in the 1990s, Beyond the Cold War (The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 214 234. 
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ef~orts. The Iran-Contra scandal and disclosure that resulted 
have (severely) damaged the perception of U. s. motives .119 
Sources have confirmed that several members of the United 
States government were involved in clandestine drug 
trafficking operations linked with the Iran - Contra arms 
shipments. VarioUS defendants testified that U.S. authorities 
did indeed have knowledge of the drug operations. Those 
defendants include: Milian Rodriguez, chief bookkeeper for 
the Medellin cartel in Colombia; Jose Blandon, chief of 
intelligence for Manuel Noriega in Panama, and John Hull, an 
American residing in Costa Rica, and considered the central 
point of the drug operation. Hull, who was indicted for 
massive cocaine trafficking, established U.S. political ties 
when he reportedly met with then Senator Dan Quayle in 1983 
during a visit to Washington, D.C. Through a chain of 
introductions, Hull was finally linked with Oliver North. 
Hull had also established relationships with several other CIA 
operati ves including: Robert Owen, Oliver North's personal 
liaison for Contra operations; and CIA's station chief in 
Costa Rica, Jose [Joe] Fernandez.1<'o 
With CIA operations providing intE-lligence and 
transportation for the Contra arms shipments, it stands to 
reason that the CIA managed drug operations as well. Several 
substantiating facts reveal the CIA's drug connection. 
According to the Kerry Report, the Ilopango Airport in El 
II"Bruce McGraw, "Bush's Fraudulent Drug War, The Contra-Drug 
Connection," The Truth Seeker, September-October 1989. 
I20Peter Dale Scott and Jonathon Marshall, Cocaine Politics, 
Drugs, Armies, and the CIA in Central America, Ur;iversity of 
California Press, 1991, 118. 
7I 
Salvador had specific hangers designated for Contra 
operations, and were reported to be used by aiIcraft carrying 
cocaine. l21 In March 1987, a C-47 cargo plane under joint 
U. S . -Colombian registry was shot down in Hor:.duran airspace 
after failing to identify itse1 f. Al though both Pentagon and 
Honduran officials all denied the aircraft's involvement in 
Contra operations, investigating authorities reported that 
the aircraft had been under surveillance for some time, and 
was suspected to have been used in drug trafficking 
operations .122 Gerado Duran, a former Contra operation pilot 
from Costa Rica, testified, after being arrested in January 
1986, that on several occasions he had flown planeloads of 
cocaine into the United States .123 
When investigating the financial transactions of Contra 
operations, several were reportedly tied t.) known front 
organizations of drug trafficking cartels. There was also 
financial evidence linking Contra operations with several 
Miami-based cocaine trafficking organizations. Records reveal 
the names of Ted Shakley, Tom Clines, and Richard Secord, all 
involved with Iran-Contra and all previously released from CIA 
employment during the Carter administration, who had set up 
links with Latin American drug cartels during their government 
employment. 
,21Senate Committee of Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on 
Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations, Drugs, Law 
Enforcement, and Foreign pOlicy, U.S. Goverrunenc: Printing Office, 
1989, 37. 
mWilliam Branigan, tlHonduras Shoots Down tr:':'dentified 
Plane," Washington Post, 11 March 1987. 
123 I bid, 49. 
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in 62 being petitioned for possible court action. Of those, 
14 placed, 27 were assigned probation, 17 were dismissed, and 
5 categorized as other [witness, plea bargain.' .lOc 
:n conclusion, what can the judicial system do to improve 
the lack of enforcement and consistency in drug-related cases 
throughout the United States? Some observers recommend the 
death penalty for those involved in drug related cases with 
excessive violence. They argue that if we really desire to 
succeed in reducing drug abuse, we must consider that while 
many drug traffickers may not actually commit the violent acts 
themselves, they are indirectly responsible by making drugs 
available, with the causal effect of the violent act. Many 
foreign nations, including Malaysia and Singapore, do 
institute the death penalty for drug-related cases and their 
statistics for drug abuse and trafficking are substantially 
lower than those for the United States. The death penalty is 
opposed by some who consider it cruel, and unusual punishment. 
The most credible form of punishment for consistent drug 
traffickers is incarceration. This may create c;vercrowding in 
prlsons. Other forms of punishment that can te implemented 
for drug related cases are strict probation programs and high 
fines. The system will first require reorganiZation, in order 
to produce the results required for success. 'l'he system must 
provide consistency in prosecuting drug offenses. 
110Juvenile Court Drug and Alcohol Cases, 1935-1988. 
National Center for Juvenile Justice, september "-990, 173. 
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6. The Antidrug Regime Lacks Coordination 
Case: DEA & FBI Drug Investigations 
In response to an increasing drug abuse problem in the 
United States, the Drug Abuse and Treatment Act of 1972 was 
passed to establish a coordinating mechanism for the several 
agencies involved with antidrug efforts. Ins tead, what many 
critics argue is that the antidrug bureaucracy has become so 
big that it has reduced efficiency. In 1965, tnere were only 
two U.S. federal agencies conducting antidrug efforts and the 
total annual budget at that time was $10 million. Today, 
there are 54 agencies involved, and the annual budget exceeds 
$13 billion. A partial list includes the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEAl, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National security Agency 
(NSA), Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Defense Intelligence 
Agency (DIA), Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), State 
Department, Pentagon, and all assets under the :i:lepartments of 
Treasury, Transportation, Defense. m If one limits the scope 
of the analysis of antidrug efforts to the DEA dnd FBI, one is 
struck by their lack of coordination. In attempting to 
consolidate antidrug efforts, the Nixon adminis1:ration created 
the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in 1;-;'3, within the 
Department of Justice. This reorganizing effor:: evolved from 
the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drug (BNDD), and 
sections of U.S. customs Service responsible for drug 
investigations .132 The DEA was designated as the lead 
IJlMichae1 Levine, The Big White Lie, The CIA and the 
Cocaine/Crack Epidemic, Thunders Mountain Press, 1993, 4 62~4 63. 
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coordinating agency for U. S. antidrug efforts ire much the same 
way that the CIA is supposed to coordinate aJl intellegence 
activities both domestically and abroad. By 1989 the DEA 
employed 2,527 special agents in its headquarters and domestic 
offices, and 252 special agents in 45 foreign countries.'-33 
To enhance the investigative capabilities of the DEA, and 
improve coordination between DEA and FBI, the U.S. Attorney 
General, in 1982, authorized the use of the FBI's vastly 
superior resources by DEA when condUcting drug investigations. 
At the same time, both agencies formally established written 
guidelines for assisting joint-agency coordination during 
investigations. These guidelines, however, are said to rarely 
be followed. Although the two agencies do conduct drug 
investigations together, statistics for 1987 to 1988, reveal 
that joint antidrug efforts only comprised of about 6 percent 
of DEA' s total cases, and 16 percent of the FBI's total drug 
cases .13' 
The sharing of intelligence is considered a maj or problem 
area by the drug control strategy and r6quires serious 
improvement. When focusing on the DEA and FBI, both have 
completely independent intelligence networks. The DEA, when 
conducting drug investigations, primarily use its indigenous 
intelligence network, the Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs 
Information System (NADDIS). Although the FBI can access this 
J32Roy Godson and Earnest May, "Thinking Abol;t 
Reorganization," Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, 
Washington, D.C., 1993. 
133Justice Department: Coordination Between DEA and FBI, 
U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO/GGD 90 59, March 1990, 2. 
134Ibid, 4. 
.1 
system, it prefers to use its own, the Organized Crime 
Information System (OCIS), and the Investigative Support 
Information System (ISIS). The use of two completely separate 
agency systems has created duplication 0:'" efforts and 
inefficiency federal antidrug investigations and 
intelligence collection.135 
With the lack of coordination between the DEA and FBI being 
a consistent problem, the probability of merging the two 
agencies has been considered by past and current 
administrations: first in 1981; then in 1987; and more 
recently, in 1993, under the Clinton administration. The two 
agencies realistically have two totally different missions, 
and should be kept that way. The DEA, being focused on 
antidrug efforts, has the expertise, and unique capabilities 
for this "different" type of war. The FBI, tasked with the 
internal security of the nation, is much more technologically 
equipped, but lacks the knowledge and experience in drug 
operations. Both agencies utilize very different investigative 
techniques, and basically have established their own 
personalities. To merge the two would only further aggravate 
the already excessive turf-wars that exist between most 
federal, state, and local agencies involved in the drug war. 
In conclusion, the fact remains that coordination for 
antidrug efforts is lacking. When the Bush administration 
instituted the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), 
it did so hoping to provide a mechanism to coordinate 
antidrug efforts. Its cabinet-level status, however, allowed 
!l~ational Drug Control Strategy 1994, the Office of 
National Drug Control Policy, Executive Office of the President, 
Washington, D.C., February 1994, 44. 
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it to be consumed by politics and make it less effective in 
implementing the antidrug policy. Its responsibility 
encompasses the establishment of policy, ')bjectives and 
priorities for the nation's drug control stra1:egy. It does 
not, however, have any authority to direct antidrug agencies 
in their acti vi ty. The creation of the ONDCP consequently had 
very little impact on improving coordination of the antidrug 
regime. 130 In reality, there is no one agency in command of 
this international effort, nor does anyone office hold enough 
authority to institute any real coordinated effort, and 
enforce it. 
If U. S. policy~makers are serious about coordinating 
antidrug efforts, they should indeed give one agency the power 
and authority to direct such efforts. The ONDCP is a move in 
the right direction, but decision~makers should also allow the 
ONDCP to have not only planning responsibilities, but 
directive authority as well. This would eliminate a large 
majority of turf~wars that severely limit success in counter~ 
drug operations. 
i36Donald J. Mabry, The Latin American Narcotics Trade and 
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